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 A theory is a picture, mentally formed, of a 
bounded realm or domain of activity. If ?truth? is 
the question, then we are in the realm of law, not 
theory.1
 This brief paper will explore two main 
issues relating to neorealism. The first holds 
that neorealism is a diluted form of idealism. The 
second builds on this first notion by exploring how 
neorealism ?Waltzian style? is a system which 
reproduces its own means of production through a 
selection bias. In other words, Waltz claims to take 
a structural approach to analyzing international 
politics because of its ability to provide a general 
picture of the systemic features of the international 
scene and why the units within that system behave 
as they do. There is a difference, however, between 
simplifying to construct a platform from which 
to look at complex realities of actors/units in a 
system, and simplifying as a way to avoid looking at 
these complexities because they could potentially 
threaten the coherency of the system of analysis. 
It is my contention that Waltz and, structural 
realists in general, engage in the latter form of 
simplification. Finally, I am neither interested 
in offering a "better" way to conceptualize the 
international scene, nor policy prescriptions 
which our nation's leaders can follow. Rather, the 
endeavor undertaken is a critique of ideology?
an ideology that is often submerged in a Waltzian-
style structural analysis.
 A common Modern theoretical move is to 
separate theory from practice because of what 
the abstract can do to the workings of a particular 
system of thought.2 In chapter one of his book 
entitled Theory of International Politics, Kenneth 
Waltz goes through an elaborate description of 
why theory must be separated from practice in 
order to construct a model through which one 
can analyze how a structure defines the behavior 
of the units within that structure. Following 19th 
century positivist thought, the concept ?theory? 
is rendered as abstract and nearly unimportant, 
while primary emphasis is placed on the testing of 
the concept in the reality of a system determined 
by structural boundaries. Because neorealism is 
a system of thought held together by the glue of 
the rational behavior of states within the system, 
perversions ?irrational behavior? must be rendered 
to the abstract ?concept? realm so that they do 
not jam the system of testing hypotheses in the 
practical realm.
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 In short, although ?perversions? exist within 
the practical realm of state action that structural 
realists3 hold onto so dearly, they must posit them 
as lying elsewhere because their system cannot 
account for them and they therefore threaten 
the very operation of the structural assemblage. 
Indeed, the realm of theory ?the abstract concept? 
becomes the trash bin for the perverse where 
elements that fail to reaffirm the running of the 
system can be placed. The positivist move is 
one in which the analyst does not worry about 
inconsistencies because the system will take care 
of them.
 In an international system characterized by 
anarchy, Mearsheimer provides a clear picture 
for us as to what the role of the state is in that 
system. The state provides a comfort zone so 
that security can be achieved on the inside while 
anarchy reigns on the outside. In other words, for 
structural realists the state is Linus? blanket that 
provides security and blocks from our vision the 
fact that there are ?monsters underneath the bed? 
?perversions in state behavior?. Structural realism 
allows analysts like Waltz and Mearsheimer to 
paint a picture of the world with an order that 
is predictable and where, for the most part, 
events are contained by and within a security 
mechanism called the balance of power. Of course, 
monsters are always sticking their heads out from 
underneath the bed, and it is then when the state 
must act to push them back into the trash bin and 
to retrieve the blanket of security.
 Inherent in the analyses of neorealists like 
Waltz, Mearsheimer, and Wohlforth is a nostalgia 
for the simplistic and easily ?structuralized? times 
of the Cold War period. Two questions that come 
to mind are; Why was the Cold War a time of 
simplicity ? And, for whom was it simplistic ? That 
is, did the period appear to be simplistic because of 
the actual structure of the international system ? 
Or, was it because the neorealist model hides 
inconsistencies and complexities with a systematic 
coherency ? It is my argument that the latter is 
true. The end of the Cold War made more visible 
what was always already the case? that we live 
in an unpredictable world where rational action 
is, at best, only part of the picture. In fact, what 
is deemed rational by one actor is often deemed 
irrational by ?an? other. This is inherent in all 
ideological conflicts. First and foremost they involve 
demonizing the other through various forms of 
metonymy. That is, presenting certain valid or 
invalid characteristics of the other and projecting 
them as constituting the ?whole? of the other and 
yourself as opposed to this evil other.
 The game of mapping the behavior of 
states in the international system is one in which 
certainty is a hard to come by commodity. Mapping 
is always contextual ? connections/relations 
can be made, but the process of mapping cannot 
lead one to a center point ?security as the basis 
for action within the neorealist structure? from 
which all behavior can be seen as a deviation from 
that center point. To imply that this is possible as 
structural realists do, is to reduce an extremely 
complex array of actors ?states, NGOs, etc.? in the 
international system into a simplistic and ready-
made analytical exercise. Even Machiavelli advised 
the Prince that realism was not to be made into a 
system of thought? that it was to be used as a 
contextual tool that molds to a particular situation 
rather than molding a given situation to the tool. 
The notion of the simplicity of ?... the similarity of 
forces and doctrines?4 across nations that is pushed 
by structural realists, automatically excludes 
the possibility that different details may produce 
different results/motivations behind behavior 
thus rendering events contextual as the classical 
realists saw them. In short, structural realists 
have a degree of certainty that was not present 
in the early thoughts of classical realists such as 
Machiavelli and Hobbes.
 As for specific examples pointing to how 
neorealists render perversities to the abstract, 
Mearsheimer and Layne provide us with two 
which center on the development of fascism. First, 
Mearsheimer makes it clear that ?Germany?s 
murderous conduct during World War II should be 
distinguished from the scope of the aggressiveness 
of German foreign policy.?5 In other words, this 
action by Germany exceeds the bounds of a 
neorealist explanation and is, in a short sentence, 
attributed to domestic factors that cannot be 
linked to the international distribution of power 
which ultimately led to World War II. This action 
was clearly irrational and therefore is dropped by 
Mearsheimer because it would jam the rational 
schematic of structural realism in relation to 
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state behavior. The possibility that Germany?s 
hideous domestic activities could have been 
triggered by international actions such as the harsh 
sanctions they were delivered by the international 
community after World War I, is completely 
ignored. Layne also fails to incorporate fascistic 
irrational behavior into the neorealist schematic 
and simply drops it after a quick mention.6
 The point to be made is that perversions/
aberrations cannot mix with a systemic engine 
based on rational behavior. To the extent that 
structural realism cannot account for these 
aberrations, it also cannot account for or deny 
the significance of their causal relations of war 
and other crises. In other words, this is the blind 
spot of structural realism. Structural realists 
sidestep issues of desire connected to power and 
attach states? moves to become a great power 
to structural necessities. In essence, this move 
cleanses subjectivity with an idealist form of 
objectivity. And this move makes sense in relation 
to my thesis, for it is precisely out of notions 
of desire connected to power that aberrations/ 
perversities can and do arise? the very issues that 
are beyond the bounds of a neorealist explanation. 
Therefore, because security in an anarchic 
international system is what drives individual units 
to act, U.S. involvement in many crises such as the 
Gulf War, Bosnia, Vietnam, etc., and certain aspects 
of that involvement in relation to desire and power, 
remain in the blind spot of neorealists. In addition, 
so do the actions of someone like Saddam Hussein. 
To admit that perhaps his actions were attached 
to power-desires and not to rational moves 
towards increasing security, would be to admit to 
the fact that contingency is a major player in the 
international arena. Hence, monsters will always 
manage to make their way out from underneath the 
bed? a claim neorealists do not want to make or 
miss behind the walls of their structural mode of 
analysis.
 Implicit within neorealist analyses is a 
utopia not far from what idealists purported. 
That is, if all is attached to a need for security, 
then this is a manageable and potential outcome 
in the international arena. We have just not yet 
developed the institutions to bring this about or 
the vocabulary to speak adequately to meeting 
this utopia. In other words, neorealism substitutes 
idealist-style hope mechanisms for what simply 
remained as contingent and contextual for classical 
realists such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, and 
Hobbes. 
 Saying that the structure is the catalyst 
for action is to say that objectivity rules over 
subjectivity. I am not arguing that structures don't 
constrain actors, for they clearly do. What I am 
arguing, however, is that privileging structures 
?objectivity? over actors ?subjectivity? is a move 
which, once again, cleanses such notions as a 
desire for power and the desire to dominate ?an?
other. Therefore, inherent in this cleansing is 
the possibility of reaching a utopian realm where 
contingency ?perversity? is contained. Notions 
such as states becoming ?secure and autonomous? 
found throughout neorealist literature, are idealist 
in nature. In the sentiments of E.H. Carr, they 
work to set universals which are presented as 
being the best possible scenario for all when, in 
fact, they mask the desire of a hegemon to maintain 
the status-quo, as much as is possible, for their 
own benefit.7
 My critiques of structural realism are not 
meant to suggest that predictions or generalizations 
about the behavior of states in the international 
system cannot be made. They can be made and, in 
fact, classical realists have made valuable insights 
into state behavior since they began to speculate 
about the causes of war. But structural realists 
have gone a step beyond their predecessors by 
attempting to contain chance within a structure that 
creates an inside/outside binary and by selecting 
what its analysts label  significant events to plug 
into the system while discarding aberrations in the 
outside ?abstract? trash bin.
 It is true that social scientists must focus in 
on a limited number of variables in order to make 
modes of analysis ?doable,? but it is the confident 
discarding of events that are beyond neorealist 
rational behavior explanations? events which 
could harm their theory? that are suspect. At 
least Machiavelli and Hobbes were willing to 
look underneath the bed unlike neorealists such 
as Mearsheimer. Of course, classical realists 
eventually contained the perverse ?language 
and its various interpretations, for Hobbes?, but 
they were conscious of this move and why they 
made it. Therefore, their dogmatism is clear and 
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visible. The issues that Hobbes and Machiavelli 
dealt with first were ones of contingency. I am not 
nostalgic for their return, I am simply using them 
to highlight how realism as an explanatory tool 
has become more and more static and therefore 
structurally limited in what it can attempt to 
explain.
 Taking my critiques into consideration, an 
important question that emerges is: Does the 
inability of the neorealist model to account for 
irrational behavior render the mode of analysis 
useless ? My answer to this question is a simple, 
?no.? The neorealist schematic provides insights 
into the fact that conflict and power struggles are 
inherent in all political relations8 defined in terms of 
security. Neorealism provides one more significant 
piece to the puzzle of a deeper understanding of 
state behavior in the international system. It does 
not, however, provide a snapshot of the whole 
picture? which is something many would like it to 
do and even imply that it does do. At the very least, 
the fact that the structural realist system ignores 
behavior that states often engage in, or ignores 
possible motivations behind that behavior, weakens 
its foundation and points to the fact that we cannot 
be certain about its conclusions.
 At most, we can use structural realism as a 
guide pointing in one direction of possible causes 
for war and other crises. But it cannot be used to 
provide a center point that incorporates all actions 
within one meaningful schematic in which all 
else is a deviation from the center point of that 
schematic. Structural realism creates a vacuum 
within which there is a clear connection between 
cause and effect that is undeniably linked to the 
international system of anarchy and the need by 
states for security. The schematic, for the most 
part, is immune to other? perhaps even primary 
? causes, domestic or not.
 The implicit neorealist assumption that a 
utopia is reachable comes in at least two forms. 
The first is a consistent anarchical international 
system that makes possible predictions as to the 
behavior of states and the motivations behind that 
behavior. The second is the assumption made by 
Layne that it is possible for America to construct 
a position independent of subjective perceptions 
that is, ?...just right? strong enough to defend 
American interests without provoking others.?9
 With the end of the Cold War, neorealists do 
hold that the structure of the international system 
has changed and therefore outcomes will also 
change. But neorealism is not dead because of the 
fact that its basis still remains true...that states 
are, for the most part, rational actors motivated 
by a need for security. This tenet found within 
neorealism is unchangeable as long as the trash 
bin for aberrations remains. Therefore, neorealist 
explanations leave much to be explained and what 
they do explain are reflections of a masked desire 
by analysts/scholars to contain contingency. This 
desire is masked by a deterministic structure that 
is privileged over the actions of individual units and 
their access to various levers of power and other 
motivations for their actions. 
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